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Single Idea 6426

[filed under theme 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism ]

Full Idea

The nerve of the Intuitionist theory, led by Brouwer, is the denial of the law of excluded middle; it holds that a proposition can only be accounted true or false when there is some method of ascertaining which of these it is.

Gist of Idea

Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it

Source

Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.2)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'My Philosophical Development' [Routledge 1993], p.82


A Reaction

He cites 'there are three successive sevens in the expansion of pi' as a case in point. This seems to me an example of the verificationism and anti-realism which is typical of that period. It strikes me as nonsense, but Russell takes it seriously.


The 23 ideas from 'My Philosophical Development'

Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell]
In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell]
Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell]
Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell]
We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell]
Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell]
Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell]
Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell]
Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell]
Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell]
In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell]
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell]
You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]
Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell]
I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell]
Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell]
The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell]
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell]
Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell]
Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell]
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell]