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Single Idea 6435

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions ]

Full Idea

If you have just heard a loud clap of thunder, you believe what is expressed by 'there has just been a loud clap of thunder' even if no words come into your mind.

Gist of Idea

You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words

Source

Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.13)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'My Philosophical Development' [Routledge 1993], p.114


A Reaction

This seems to me important, and accurate. We should not be too mesmerised by language. Animals have beliefs, and this is a nice example of an undeniable non-linguistic human belief.


The 20 ideas with the same theme [propositions as features of thought]:

Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
Words are for meaning, and once you have that you can forget the words [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying [Diod.Cronus, by Gellius]
Humans have rational impressions, which are conceptual, and are true or false [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham]
I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley]
You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]
Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact [Russell]
A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein]
Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]
We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe]
Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen]
If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein]
There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati]
We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach]