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Single Idea 6435

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions ]

Full Idea

If you have just heard a loud clap of thunder, you believe what is expressed by 'there has just been a loud clap of thunder' even if no words come into your mind.

Gist of Idea

You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words

Source

Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.13)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'My Philosophical Development' [Routledge 1993], p.114


A Reaction

This seems to me important, and accurate. We should not be too mesmerised by language. Animals have beliefs, and this is a nice example of an undeniable non-linguistic human belief.


The 23 ideas from 'My Philosophical Development'

Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell]
In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell]
Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell]
Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell]
We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell]
Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell]
Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell]
Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell]
Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell]
Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell]
In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell]
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell]
You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]
Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell]
I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell]
Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell]
The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell]
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell]
Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell]
Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell]
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell]