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Full Idea
Unlike descriptions, names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate.
Gist of Idea
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate
Source
Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.14)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'My Philosophical Development' [Routledge 1993], p.125
A Reaction
This interests Russell because of its ontological implications. If we reduce language to names, we can have a pure ontology of 'objects'. We need a system for saying whether a description names something - which is his theory of definite descriptions.
| 18937 | If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer] |
| 18940 | It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege] |
| 18939 | In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege] |
| 6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
| 18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 10426 | A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell] |
| 13361 | An expression is only a name if it succeeds in referring to a real object [Bostock] |
| 10429 | It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury] |
| 19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
| 12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
| 18946 | Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer] |
| 18934 | Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer] |
| 18938 | Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer] |