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Single Idea 6440

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism ]

Full Idea

Those who dislike universals have thought that they could be merely words; the trouble with this view is that a word itself is a universal.

Gist of Idea

Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals

Source

Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.14)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'My Philosophical Development' [Routledge 1993], p.128


A Reaction

Russell gradually lost his faith in most things, but never in universals. I find it unconvincing that we might dismiss nominalism so easily. I'm not sure why the application of the word 'cat' could not just be conventional.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [unversals are really just linguistic predicates]:

Only words can be 'predicated of many'; the universality is just in its mode of signifying [Abelard, by Panaccio]
Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell]
If we apply the same word to different things, it is only because we are willing to do so [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Quine, by Armstrong]
Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)]
Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong]
We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong]
It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong]
'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor]
Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe]
'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe]
There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland]