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Single Idea 6440

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism ]

Full Idea

Those who dislike universals have thought that they could be merely words; the trouble with this view is that a word itself is a universal.

Gist of Idea

Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals

Source

Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.14)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'My Philosophical Development' [Routledge 1993], p.128


A Reaction

Russell gradually lost his faith in most things, but never in universals. I find it unconvincing that we might dismiss nominalism so easily. I'm not sure why the application of the word 'cat' could not just be conventional.


The 23 ideas from 'My Philosophical Development'

Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell]
In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell]
Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell]
Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell]
We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell]
Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell]
Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell]
Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell]
Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell]
Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell]
In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell]
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell]
You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]
Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell]
I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell]
Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell]
The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell]
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell]
Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell]
Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell]
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell]