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Full Idea
Not all true beliefs are knowledge; the stock example to the contrary is that of a clock which has stopped by which I believe to be going and which I happen to look at when, by chance, it shows the right time.
Gist of Idea
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment
Source
Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.15)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'My Philosophical Development' [Routledge 1993], p.140
A Reaction
[in his 1948:112] Russell had spotted Gettier-type problems long before Gettier. The problem of lucky true beliefs dates back to Plato (Idea 2140). This example is also a problem for reliabilism, if the clock is usually working fine.
Related Idea
Idea 2140 True belief without knowledge is like blind people on the right road [Plato]
| 6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
| 5430 | A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell] |
| 5429 | True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell] |
| 8886 | Being a true justified belief is not a sufficient condition for knowledge [Gettier] |
| 20225 | For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski] |
| 20226 | Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski] |
| 20228 | We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski] |
| 20227 | Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski] |
| 19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
| 19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
| 19728 | Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T] |
| 19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
| 19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |