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Single Idea 6444
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
]
Full Idea
Not all true beliefs are knowledge; the stock example to the contrary is that of a clock which has stopped by which I believe to be going and which I happen to look at when, by chance, it shows the right time.
Gist of Idea
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment
Source
Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.15)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'My Philosophical Development' [Routledge 1993], p.140
A Reaction
[in his 1948:112] Russell had spotted Gettier-type problems long before Gettier. The problem of lucky true beliefs dates back to Plato (Idea 2140). This example is also a problem for reliabilism, if the clock is usually working fine.
Related Idea
Idea 2140
True belief without knowledge is like blind people on the right road [Plato]
The
23 ideas
from 'My Philosophical Development'
6420
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Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy
[Russell]
|
6419
|
In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism
[Russell]
|
6426
|
Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it
[Russell]
|
7528
|
Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions
[Russell]
|
6423
|
We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts
[Russell]
|
6425
|
Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion
[Russell]
|
6424
|
Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess
[Russell]
|
6427
|
Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false
[Russell]
|
6431
|
Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience'
[Russell]
|
6432
|
Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have
[Russell]
|
6430
|
In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds
[Russell]
|
6434
|
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities
[Russell]
|
6433
|
Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images
[Russell]
|
6435
|
You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words
[Russell]
|
6440
|
Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals
[Russell]
|
6436
|
I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience
[Russell]
|
6438
|
Complex things can be known, but not simple things
[Russell]
|
6437
|
The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate
[Russell]
|
6439
|
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate
[Russell]
|
6442
|
Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences
[Russell]
|
6441
|
Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes
[Russell]
|
6443
|
Surprise is a criterion of error
[Russell]
|
6444
|
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment
[Russell]
|