more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 6449
[filed under theme 23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
]
Full Idea
Hare has proposed that utilitarianism is the ultimate standard to which we are led by the categorical imperative.
Gist of Idea
The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism
Source
report of Richard M. Hare (Freedom and Reason [1963], p.123-4) by Thomas Nagel - Equality and Partiality
Book Ref
Nagel,Thomas: 'Equality and Partiality' [OUP 1995], p.44
A Reaction
It seems to me better to say that Kant starts (unwittingly) from something like utilitarianism, that is, an assumption that human happiness and welfare have some sort of intrinsic value that cannot be demonstrated. Otherwise evil can be universalised.
The
20 ideas
from Richard M. Hare
22331
|
Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable
[Hare, by Glock]
|
22484
|
Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism
[Hare, by Foot]
|
6449
|
The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism
[Hare, by Nagel]
|
2855
|
In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary
[Hare, by Hooker,B]
|
16050
|
The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good
[Hare]
|
4125
|
Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism
[Hare, by Williams,B]
|
4126
|
If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views
[Williams,B on Hare]
|
4127
|
If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors
[Williams,B on Hare]
|
4360
|
By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright
[Hare]
|
22483
|
A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on
[Hare]
|
2703
|
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation
[Hare]
|
2704
|
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism
[Hare]
|
2705
|
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones?
[Hare]
|
2706
|
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons
[Hare]
|
2707
|
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved
[Hare]
|
2708
|
An 'ought' statement implies universal application
[Hare]
|
2709
|
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable
[Hare]
|
2710
|
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle
[Hare]
|
2711
|
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't
[Hare]
|
2712
|
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate
[Hare]
|