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Full Idea
My own view is that moral justification must be capable of motivating, but not in virtue of reliance on pre-moral motives.
Gist of Idea
Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives
Source
Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5)
Book Ref
Nagel,Thomas: 'Equality and Partiality' [OUP 1995], p.45
A Reaction
This may well be the core and essence of Kantian moral theory. I'm inclined to think of it as 'Kant's dream', which is of ultra-rational beings who are driven by pure rationality as a motivator. People who fit this bill tend to be academics.
| 6479 | Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel] |
| 6446 | In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel] |
| 6448 | A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel] |
| 6447 | Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel] |
| 6477 | I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel] |
| 6450 | Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel] |
| 6478 | Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel] |