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Single Idea 6458

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems ]

Full Idea

There is some difficulty in deciding what is to be considered one sense-datum: often attention causes divisions to appear where, so far as can be discovered, there were no divisions before.

Gist of Idea

Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to

Source

Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Mysticism and Logic' [Unwin 1989], p.142

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A Reaction

This was, I suspect, why Russell had dropped the idea of sense-data by 1921. He does, however, say that they are the last unit in analysis, rather than being the most basic unit of perception. In other words, they are purely theoretical.

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The 19 ideas with the same theme [difficulties with the concept of sense-data]:

6476	We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell]

8854	My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell]

6458	Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]

6469	Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]

15580

There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger]

18729

Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein]

6501	As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H]

6493	We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth]

21686

Sense-data are dubious abstractions, with none of the plausibility of tables [Quine]

15819

Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm]

3296	Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel]

15244

We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden]

7639	The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans]

3581	Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M]

6505	Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H]

4101	If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane]

4102	The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane]

6639	The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe]

4720	Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady]