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Single Idea 6458

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems ]

Full Idea

There is some difficulty in deciding what is to be considered one sense-datum: often attention causes divisions to appear where, so far as can be discovered, there were no divisions before.

Gist of Idea

Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to

Source

Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Mysticism and Logic' [Unwin 1989], p.142

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A Reaction

This was, I suspect, why Russell had dropped the idea of sense-data by 1921. He does, however, say that they are the last unit in analysis, rather than being the most basic unit of perception. In other words, they are purely theoretical.

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The 18 ideas from 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics'

6483	Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H]

8244	Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]

6459	We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell]

6458	Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]

6460	'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell]

6461	Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell]

6462	Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell]

6463	Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell]

6464	Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell]

6470	Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell]

6465	We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]

6466	Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]

6467	No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell]

6468	There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell]

6469	Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]

6471	The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]

6472	Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]

6473	Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell]