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Single Idea 6460

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / c. Unperceived sense-data ]

Full Idea

I shall give the name 'sensibilia' to those objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data without necessarily being data to any mind.

Gist of Idea

'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind

Source

Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Mysticism and Logic' [Unwin 1989], p.143


A Reaction

This is his response to the problem of whether sense-data can exist independently of experience, which was unclear in 1912. Presumably sensibilia are objects which are possible sources of experience, but that seems to cover most objects.


The 18 ideas from 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics'

Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H]
Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell]
Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell]
Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell]
Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell]
Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell]
Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell]
Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell]
We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]
No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell]
There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell]
Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell]