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Single Idea 6463
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
]
Full Idea
Logically a sense-datum is an object, a particular of which the subject is aware; it does not contain the subject as a part, as for example beliefs and volitions do.
Clarification
'Volitions' are acts of will
Gist of Idea
Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do
Source
Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'Mysticism and Logic' [Unwin 1989], p.146
A Reaction
This very firmly rejects any notion that a sense-datum is mental. It is a left as a strange sort of object which gets as close as it is possible to get to the 'borders' of the mind, without actually becoming part of it.
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[what sense-data would consist of]:
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22013
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Subjects distinguish representations, as related both to subject and object
[Reinhold]
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6483
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Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain
[Russell, by Robinson,H]
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8244
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Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science
[Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
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6462
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Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics
[Russell]
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6463
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Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do
[Russell]
|
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6464
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Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject
[Russell]
|
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6467
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No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once
[Russell]
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7549
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If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist
[Russell]
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7553
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Sense-data are purely physical
[Russell]
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17642
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The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty
[Putnam]
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6457
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Sensations are mental, but sense-data could be mind-independent
[Vesey]
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6454
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Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they?
[Lacey]
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6453
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Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects
[Lacey]
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2775
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It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts
[Dancy,J]
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6480
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Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality
[Robinson,H]
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6482
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For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects
[Robinson,H]
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2713
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Are sense-data independent, with identity, substance and location?
[Tye]
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