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Single Idea 6466
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
]
Full Idea
The supreme maxim in scientific philosophising is this: Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.
Gist of Idea
Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities
Source
Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VI)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'Mysticism and Logic' [Unwin 1989], p.149
A Reaction
This seems to represent Russell's first move (in 1914) into what looks like phenomenalism. One might ask what is the difference between 'logical constructions' and 'inferred entities'. The latter appear to have unity, so I prefer them.
The
31 ideas
with the same theme
[reality is just actual and potential appearances]:
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1549
|
Everything that exists consists in being perceived
[Protagoras]
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2261
|
My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false
[Descartes]
|
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12739
|
If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws
[Leibniz]
|
|
5192
|
Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations
[Berkeley, by Ayer]
|
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5174
|
Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things
[Ayer on Berkeley]
|
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3931
|
Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities
[Berkeley]
|
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6722
|
Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit
[Berkeley]
|
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5601
|
There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences
[Kant]
|
|
3583
|
External objects are permanent possibilities of sensation
[Mill]
|
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18988
|
Behind the bare phenomenal facts there is nothing
[Wright,Ch]
|
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23207
|
Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer
[Nietzsche]
|
|
6418
|
Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
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6466
|
Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities
[Russell]
|
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4153
|
Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made?
[Wittgenstein]
|
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20743
|
Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence
[Sartre]
|
|
8824
|
No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940
[Ayer, by Kim]
|
|
6525
|
Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door'
[Robinson,H on Ayer]
|
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5170
|
Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents
[Ayer]
|
|
2614
|
Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data
[Ayer]
|
|
18209
|
We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism
[Quine]
|
|
8199
|
The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy
[Dummett]
|
|
2778
|
Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences
[Dancy,J]
|
|
3592
|
Phenomenalism is a form of idealism
[Williams,M]
|
|
2721
|
If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end?
[Audi,R]
|
|
2722
|
Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism
[Audi,R]
|
|
6522
|
Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century)
[Robinson,H]
|
|
6359
|
Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
|
7301
|
The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable
[Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
|
|
7302
|
Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects
[Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
|
|
7303
|
If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'?
[Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
|
|
20963
|
A philosopher and his wife are out for a drive...
[Sommers,W]
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