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Single Idea 6471

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique ]

Full Idea

The assumption of permanent substance, which technically underlies the procedure of physics, cannot of course be regarded as metaphysically legitimate.

Gist of Idea

The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate

Source

Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Mysticism and Logic' [Unwin 1989], p.162

A Reaction

It is a moot point whether physicists still thought this way after the full arrival of quantum theory in 1926. Russell raises all sorts of nice questions about the relationship between physics and philosophy here. I'm on Russell's side.

The 20 ideas with the same theme [objections to the very concept of substances]:

3628 Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes]
16774 Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau]
12485 We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke]
7931 If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C]
16636 A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley]
12048 The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume]
13424 Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume]
11833 The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant]
18981 'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James]
14733 An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell]
6465 We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
6471 The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
15304 We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden]
7046 Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil]
12252 Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
7932 A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C]
7937 When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C]
7939 Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C]
7940 A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C]
16775 For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau]