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Single Idea 6472
[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
]
Full Idea
Continuity is not a sufficient criterion of material identity; it is sufficient in many cases, such as rocks and tables, where the appearances change slowly, but in others, such as the parts of an approximately homogeneous fluid, it fails us utterly.
Clarification
A 'homogeneous' has the same texture throughout, such as water
Gist of Idea
Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid
Source
Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'Mysticism and Logic' [Unwin 1989], p.164
A Reaction
It might be debatable to what extent the 'parts' of a homogeneous fluid have identity. How many 'parts' are there in a glass of water? This seems, now, a problem for internalists; externalists can define the identity by the unseen molecules.
The
18 ideas
from 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics'
6483
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Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain
[Russell, by Robinson,H]
|
8244
|
Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science
[Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
|
6459
|
We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data
[Russell]
|
6458
|
Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to
[Russell]
|
6461
|
Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands
[Russell]
|
6460
|
'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind
[Russell]
|
6462
|
Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics
[Russell]
|
6463
|
Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do
[Russell]
|
6464
|
Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject
[Russell]
|
6470
|
Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes
[Russell]
|
6465
|
We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it
[Russell]
|
6466
|
Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities
[Russell]
|
6468
|
There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives'
[Russell]
|
6467
|
No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once
[Russell]
|
6469
|
Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them
[Russell]
|
6471
|
The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate
[Russell]
|
6472
|
Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid
[Russell]
|
6473
|
Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws
[Russell]
|