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Single Idea 6473

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects ]

Full Idea

We may lay down the following definition: Physical things are those series of appearances whose matter obeys the laws of physics.

Gist of Idea

Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws

Source

Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Mysticism and Logic' [Unwin 1989], p.165

A Reaction

We will then have to define the laws of physic without making any reference to 'physical things'. There is an obvious suspicion of circularity somewhere here. I find it very odd to define objects just in terms of their appearances.

The 37 ideas with the same theme [what distinctively unifies physical objects]:

16154 Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
16158 Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
12499 Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion [Locke]
5533 Objects in themselves are not known to us at all [Kant]
21449 The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience [Kant]
14732 A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell]
6473 Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell]
23466 Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein]
8498 Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience [Quine]
9018 A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time [Quine]
1628 If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine]
8464 Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine]
7924 The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine]
2351 Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam]
10541 Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett]
17556 Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen]
8264 Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe]
8515 Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K]
8519 Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
7685 An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette]
7008 Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil]
7018 Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil]
10272 The notion of 'object' is at least partially structural and mathematical [Shapiro]
8267 Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe]
8265 Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe]
8275 Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe]
16130 To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe]
16232 An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley]
6124 I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist [Merricks]
6134 Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts? [Merricks]
10782 The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo]
14952 Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross]
14485 Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
14487 The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
23772 If objects are property bundles, the properties need combining powers [Williams,NE]
22627 Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson]