more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 6473

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects ]

Full Idea

We may lay down the following definition: Physical things are those series of appearances whose matter obeys the laws of physics.

Gist of Idea

Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws

Source

Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Mysticism and Logic' [Unwin 1989], p.165


A Reaction

We will then have to define the laws of physic without making any reference to 'physical things'. There is an obvious suspicion of circularity somewhere here. I find it very odd to define objects just in terms of their appearances.


The 18 ideas from 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics'

Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H]
Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell]
Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell]
Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell]
Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell]
Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell]
Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell]
Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell]
We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]
No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell]
There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell]
Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell]