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Full Idea
Undeniably, knowledge comes through seeing, but it is a mistake to regard the mere seeing itself as knowledge; if we are so to regard it, we must distinguish the seeing from what is seen; a patch of colour is one thing, and our seeing it is another.
Gist of Idea
Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour
Source
Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'The Analysis of Mind' [Routledge 1995], p.141
A Reaction
This is Russell's 1921 explanation of why he adopted sense-data (but he rejects them later in this paragraph). This gives a simplistic impression of what he intended, which has three components: the object, the 'sensibile', and the sense-datum.
| 6417 | In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 6474 | Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell] |
| 6476 | We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell] |
| 6475 | In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell] |
| 2792 | It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell] |
| 22326 | Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell] |