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Single Idea 6476

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems ]

Full Idea

If we are to avoid a perfectly gratuitous assumption, we must dispense with the subject as one of the actual ingredients of the world; but when we do this, the possibility of distinguishing the sensation from the sense-datum vanishes.

Clarification

The 'subject' is the self, or the ego, or stable personal identity

Gist of Idea

We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data

Source

Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'The Analysis of Mind' [Routledge 1995], p.142


A Reaction

This is the reason why Russell himself rejected sense-data. It is more normal, I think, to reject them simply as being superfluous. If the subject can simply perceive the sense-data, why can't they just perceive the object more directly?


The 19 ideas with the same theme [difficulties with the concept of sense-data]:

We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell]
My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell]
Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger]
Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein]
As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H]
We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth]
Sense-data are dubious abstractions, with none of the plausibility of tables [Quine]
Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm]
Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel]
We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden]
The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans]
Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M]
Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H]
If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane]
The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane]
The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe]
Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady]