more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 6481

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality ]

Full Idea

Intentional states are mysterious things; if they are intrinsically about other things, what properties, if any, do they possess intrinsically?

Gist of Idea

If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties?

Source

Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.1)

Book Ref

Robinson,Howard: 'Perception' [Routledge 2001], p.2


A Reaction

A very nice question, which I suspect to be right at the heart of the tendency towards externalist accounts of the mind. Since you can only talk about the contents of the thoughts, you can't put forward a decent internalist account of what is going on.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [what exactly is intentionality?]:

All mental phenomena contain an object [Brentano]
Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre]
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle]
Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle]
Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle]
Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim]
Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor]
How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB]
If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar]
Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H]
Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane]
Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane]
Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil]
Dreams and imagery show the brain can generate awareness and meaning without input [Edelman/Tononi]
Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider]