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Single Idea 6482

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data ]

Full Idea

For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are part of physical objects, for objects consist only of actual or actual and possible sense-data; representative realists say they just have an abstract and structural resemblance to objects.

Gist of Idea

For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects

Source

Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.1)

Book Ref

Robinson,Howard: 'Perception' [Routledge 2001], p.3

A Reaction

He puts Berkeley, Hume and Mill in the first group, and Locke in the second. Russell belongs in the second. The very fact that there can be two such different theories about the location of sense-data rather discredits the whole idea.

The 17 ideas with the same theme [what sense-data would consist of]:

22013 Subjects distinguish representations, as related both to subject and object [Reinhold]
6483 Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H]
8244 Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
6462 Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell]
6463 Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell]
6464 Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell]
6467 No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell]
7549 If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell]
7553 Sense-data are purely physical [Russell]
17642 The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam]
6457 Sensations are mental, but sense-data could be mind-independent [Vesey]
6453 Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey]
6454 Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey]
2775 It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J]
6480 Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H]
6482 For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H]
2713 Are sense-data independent, with identity, substance and location? [Tye]