more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 6482
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
]
Full Idea
For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are part of physical objects, for objects consist only of actual or actual and possible sense-data; representative realists say they just have an abstract and structural resemblance to objects.
Gist of Idea
For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects
Source
Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.1)
Book Ref
Robinson,Howard: 'Perception' [Routledge 2001], p.3
A Reaction
He puts Berkeley, Hume and Mill in the first group, and Locke in the second. Russell belongs in the second. The very fact that there can be two such different theories about the location of sense-data rather discredits the whole idea.
The
26 ideas
from 'Perception'
6480
|
Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality
[Robinson,H]
|
6482
|
For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects
[Robinson,H]
|
6481
|
If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties?
[Robinson,H]
|
6484
|
Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception
[Robinson,H]
|
6485
|
When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red
[Robinson,H]
|
6494
|
If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured
[Robinson,H]
|
6499
|
Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way
[Robinson,H]
|
6500
|
If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities?
[Robinson,H]
|
6497
|
We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them
[Robinson,H]
|
6520
|
If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features?
[Robinson,H]
|
6515
|
An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained
[Robinson,H]
|
6517
|
If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it?
[Robinson,H]
|
6519
|
Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined
[Robinson,H]
|
6521
|
Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world
[Robinson,H]
|
6522
|
Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century)
[Robinson,H]
|
6502
|
Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition?
[Robinson,H]
|
6504
|
For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal
[Robinson,H]
|
6503
|
Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything
[Robinson,H]
|
6505
|
Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism
[Robinson,H]
|
6506
|
'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse
[Robinson,H]
|
6507
|
Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects
[Robinson,H]
|
6511
|
If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy.
[Robinson,H]
|
6508
|
Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism
[Robinson,H]
|
6509
|
Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves
[Robinson,H]
|
6513
|
Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking?
[Robinson,H]
|
6512
|
Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more
[Robinson,H]
|