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Single Idea 6484

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation ]

Full Idea

The representative theory of perception is found in Locke, and is adopted by most moderate empiricists.

Gist of Idea

Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception

Source

Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.2)

Book Ref

Robinson,Howard: 'Perception' [Routledge 2001], p.5

A Reaction

This is, I think, my own position. Anything less than fairly robust realism strikes me as being a bit mad (despite Berkeley's endless assertions that he is preaching common sense), and direct realism seems obviously false.

The 23 ideas with the same theme [theory that mind represents in order to perceive]:

20894 Man is separated from reality [Democritus]
1734 In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle]
22168 Minds take in a likeness of things, which activates an awaiting potential [Aquinas]
7400 Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck]
18258 We can only know the exterior world via our ideas [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
12948 A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz]
3957 Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley]
6495 Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley]
2237 It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects [Hume]
16913 I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant]
6514 Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H]
13983 Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
4043 Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman]
8128 Representation must be propositional if it can give reasons and be epistemological [McDowell, by Burge]
2716 To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R]
2717 How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R]
7629 We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn]
3899 The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton]
6484 Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H]
6638 One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe]
6644 Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe]
6647 Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe]
21215 The representation may not be a likeness [Velarde-Mayol]