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Single Idea 6491
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
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Full Idea
By Berkeley - with his anti-abstractionism and imagist theory of thought - the classical sense-datum conception was firmly established, and intentionality had disappeared as an intrinsic property, not only of perceptual states, but of all mental contents.
Clarification
His 'anti-abstractionism' is his denial of universals
Gist of Idea
Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought
Source
report of George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.6
Book Ref
Robinson,Howard: 'Perception' [Routledge 2001], p.19
A Reaction
Intentionality was originally a medieval concept, and was revived by Brentano in the late nineteenth century. Nowadays intentionality is taken for granted, but I still suspect that we could drop it, and talk of nothing but brain states caused by reality.
The
33 ideas
from 'The Principles of Human Knowledge'
18876
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Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are
[Berkeley, by Cameron]
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6495
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Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism
[Robinson,H on Berkeley]
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23636
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Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds
[Reid on Berkeley]
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6491
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Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought
[Berkeley, by Robinson,H]
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6720
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Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations
[Berkeley]
|
6721
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Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self
[Berkeley]
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6722
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Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit
[Berkeley]
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6723
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The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds
[Berkeley]
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6724
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The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives
[Berkeley]
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6726
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No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities
[Berkeley]
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6727
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Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold
[Berkeley]
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6728
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Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion
[Berkeley]
|
6729
|
Material substance is just general existence which can have properties
[Berkeley]
|
6730
|
We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections
[Berkeley]
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6731
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No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy
[Berkeley]
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6732
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When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind
[Berkeley]
|
6733
|
I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind
[Berkeley]
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6714
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Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars
[Berkeley]
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6711
|
The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects
[Berkeley]
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22309
|
An idea can only be like another idea
[Berkeley]
|
6734
|
If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature
[Berkeley]
|
6735
|
All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move
[Berkeley]
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6736
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I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects
[Berkeley]
|
6737
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Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings
[Berkeley]
|
10581
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I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas
[Berkeley]
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15861
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The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience
[Berkeley]
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6713
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If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason
[Berkeley]
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6715
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Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars
[Berkeley]
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6716
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Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas
[Berkeley]
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6717
|
Abstract ideas are impossible
[Berkeley]
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6718
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I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought
[Berkeley]
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6719
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No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas
[Berkeley]
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16636
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A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents
[Berkeley]
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