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Single Idea 6497
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
]
Full Idea
The idea that objects do not possess secondary qualities intrinsically rests on the thought that they do not figure in the physicist's account of the world; ..as they are causally idle, no purpose is served by attributing them to objects.
Gist of Idea
We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them
Source
Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], III.1)
Book Ref
Robinson,Howard: 'Perception' [Routledge 2001], p.61
A Reaction
On the whole I agree with this, but colours (for example) are not causally idle, as they seem to affect the behaviour of insects. They are properties which can only have a causal effect if there is a brain in their vicinity. Physicists ignore brains.
The
26 ideas
from Howard Robinson
6480
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Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality
[Robinson,H]
|
6482
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For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects
[Robinson,H]
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6481
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If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties?
[Robinson,H]
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6484
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Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception
[Robinson,H]
|
6485
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When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red
[Robinson,H]
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6494
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If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured
[Robinson,H]
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6499
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Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way
[Robinson,H]
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6500
|
If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities?
[Robinson,H]
|
6497
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We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them
[Robinson,H]
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6519
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Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined
[Robinson,H]
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6515
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An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained
[Robinson,H]
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6517
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If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it?
[Robinson,H]
|
6521
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Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world
[Robinson,H]
|
6520
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If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features?
[Robinson,H]
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6522
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Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century)
[Robinson,H]
|
6502
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Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition?
[Robinson,H]
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6504
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For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal
[Robinson,H]
|
6503
|
Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything
[Robinson,H]
|
6505
|
Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism
[Robinson,H]
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6506
|
'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse
[Robinson,H]
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6507
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Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects
[Robinson,H]
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6511
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If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy.
[Robinson,H]
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6508
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Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism
[Robinson,H]
|
6509
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Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves
[Robinson,H]
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6513
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Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking?
[Robinson,H]
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6512
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Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more
[Robinson,H]
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