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Single Idea 6499

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities ]

Full Idea

Shape can be directly experienced by either touch or sight, which are subjectively different; but colour and sound can be directly experienced only through experiences which are subjectively like sight and hearing.

Gist of Idea

Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way

Source

Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], III.1)

Book Ref

Robinson,Howard: 'Perception' [Routledge 2001], p.68

A Reaction

This seems to be a key argument in support of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It seems to me that the distinction may be challenged and questioned, but to deny it completely (as Berkeley and Hume do) is absurd.

The 26 ideas from 'Perception'

6480 Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H]
6482 For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H]
6481 If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H]
6484 Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H]
6485 When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H]
6494 If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H]
6499 Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H]
6500 If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H]
6497 We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H]
6519 Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H]
6515 An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H]
6517 If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H]
6521 Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H]
6520 If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H]
6522 Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H]
6502 Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H]
6504 For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H]
6503 Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H]
6505 Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H]
6506 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H]
6507 Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H]
6511 If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H]
6508 Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H]
6509 Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H]
6513 Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H]
6512 Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H]