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Single Idea 6502
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
]
Full Idea
Many modern physicalists first analyse perception as no more than the acquisition of beliefs or information through the senses, and then analyse belief and the possession of information in causal or dispositional terms.
Gist of Idea
Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition?
Source
Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], V.1)
Book Ref
Robinson,Howard: 'Perception' [Routledge 2001], p.121
A Reaction
(He mentions Armstrong, Dretske and Pitcher). A reduction to dispositions implies behaviourism. This all sounds more like an eliminativist strategy than a reductive one. I would start by saying that perception is only information after interpretation.
The
26 ideas
from Howard Robinson
6480
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Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality
[Robinson,H]
|
6482
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For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects
[Robinson,H]
|
6481
|
If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties?
[Robinson,H]
|
6484
|
Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception
[Robinson,H]
|
6485
|
When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red
[Robinson,H]
|
6494
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If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured
[Robinson,H]
|
6499
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Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way
[Robinson,H]
|
6500
|
If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities?
[Robinson,H]
|
6497
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We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them
[Robinson,H]
|
6520
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If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features?
[Robinson,H]
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6515
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An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained
[Robinson,H]
|
6517
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If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it?
[Robinson,H]
|
6519
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Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined
[Robinson,H]
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6521
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Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world
[Robinson,H]
|
6522
|
Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century)
[Robinson,H]
|
6502
|
Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition?
[Robinson,H]
|
6504
|
For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal
[Robinson,H]
|
6503
|
Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything
[Robinson,H]
|
6505
|
Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism
[Robinson,H]
|
6506
|
'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse
[Robinson,H]
|
6507
|
Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects
[Robinson,H]
|
6511
|
If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy.
[Robinson,H]
|
6508
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Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism
[Robinson,H]
|
6509
|
Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves
[Robinson,H]
|
6513
|
Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking?
[Robinson,H]
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6512
|
Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more
[Robinson,H]
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