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Single Idea 6504

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism ]

Full Idea

Spatial, temporal and causal relations are the only respectable candidates for relations for a physicalist.

Gist of Idea

For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal

Source

Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], V.4)

Book Ref

Robinson,Howard: 'Perception' [Routledge 2001], p.137


A Reaction

This seems to be true, and is an absolutely crucial principle upon which any respectable physicalist account of the world must be built. It means that physicalists must attempt to explain all mental events in causal terms.


The 20 ideas with the same theme [reality consists entirely of material things in space-time]:

Some alarming thinkers think that only things which you can touch exist [Plato]
Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis]
Astronomical movements are blessed, but they don't need the help of the gods [Epicurus]
Every part of the universe is body, and non-body is not part of it [Hobbes]
Philosophical problems are resolved into empirical facts [Marx/Engels]
Every worldly event, without exception, is a redistribution of microphysical states [Quine]
My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine]
Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle]
'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim]
Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden]
Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis]
Physicalism needs more than global supervenience on the physical [Horgan,T]
Materialism requires that physics be causally complete [Horgan,T]
Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau]
For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H]
Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K]
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross]
Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K]