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Single Idea 6506
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
]
Full Idea
'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely' or 'red-squarely' or 'senses redly-squarely-tablely' and other variants sound far worse.
Gist of Idea
'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse
Source
Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], VII.5)
Book Ref
Robinson,Howard: 'Perception' [Routledge 2001], p.174
A Reaction
This is a comment on the adverbial theory, which is meant to replace representative theories based on sense-data. The problem is not that it sounds weird; it is that while plain red can be a mode of perception, being a table obviously can't.
Related Idea
Idea 15817
If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm]
The
26 ideas
from Howard Robinson
6480
|
Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality
[Robinson,H]
|
6482
|
For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects
[Robinson,H]
|
6481
|
If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties?
[Robinson,H]
|
6484
|
Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception
[Robinson,H]
|
6485
|
When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red
[Robinson,H]
|
6494
|
If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured
[Robinson,H]
|
6499
|
Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way
[Robinson,H]
|
6500
|
If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities?
[Robinson,H]
|
6497
|
We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them
[Robinson,H]
|
6519
|
Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined
[Robinson,H]
|
6515
|
An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained
[Robinson,H]
|
6517
|
If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it?
[Robinson,H]
|
6521
|
Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world
[Robinson,H]
|
6520
|
If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features?
[Robinson,H]
|
6522
|
Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century)
[Robinson,H]
|
6502
|
Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition?
[Robinson,H]
|
6504
|
For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal
[Robinson,H]
|
6503
|
Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything
[Robinson,H]
|
6505
|
Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism
[Robinson,H]
|
6506
|
'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse
[Robinson,H]
|
6507
|
Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects
[Robinson,H]
|
6511
|
If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy.
[Robinson,H]
|
6508
|
Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism
[Robinson,H]
|
6509
|
Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves
[Robinson,H]
|
6513
|
Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking?
[Robinson,H]
|
6512
|
Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more
[Robinson,H]
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