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Full Idea
Russell held in 'Problems of Philosophy' that the physical world resembles the phenomenal only in abstract structure.
Clarification
The 'phenomenal' world is that of experience
Gist of Idea
Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure
Source
report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by Howard Robinson - Perception VII.5
Book Ref
Robinson,Howard: 'Perception' [Routledge 2001], p.176
A Reaction
Russell's problem is that he then requires full-blown and elaborate 'inferences' to get from the abstract structure to some sort of 'theory' of reality, but our experience seems much more direct, even if it isn't actually 'naïve'.
| 1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 6526 | Hume says objects are not a construction, but an imaginative leap [Hume, by Robinson,H] |
| 21580 | Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell] |
| 6510 | Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 5372 | There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell] |
| 5682 | Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J] |
| 5683 | Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |