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Single Idea 6519

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension ]

Full Idea

Notoriously, Locke's filler for Descartes's geometrical matter, solidity, will not do, for that quality collapses on examination into a composite of the dispositional-cum-relational propery of impenetrability, and the secondary quality of hardness.

Gist of Idea

Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined

Source

Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.3)

Book Ref

Robinson,Howard: 'Perception' [Routledge 2001], p.220


A Reaction

I would have thought the problem was that 'matter is solidity' turns out on analysis to be a tautology. We have a handful of nearly synonymous words for matter and our experiences of it, but they boil down to some 'given' thing for which we lack words.


The 8 ideas with the same theme [matter is just whatever occupies a space]:

Bodies are three-dimensional substances [Aquinas]
Impenetrability only belongs to the essence of extension [Descartes]
Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes]
Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes]
Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz]
Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Leibniz, by Pasnau]
Extension and impenetrability together make the concept of matter [Kant]
Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H]