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Single Idea 6525

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism ]

Full Idea

Logical positivist phenomenalism has few supporters these days; ..no one ever seemed clear what the sense-datum equivalent of 'there is a table in the next room' could be.

Gist of Idea

Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door'

Source

comment on A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936]) by Howard Robinson - Perception IX.4

Book Ref

Robinson,Howard: 'Perception' [Routledge 2001], p.227

A Reaction

But do the critics know what they mean by 'there is a table in the next room'? Does it just mean 'I am hoping there is'? You can't refer to the table in the next room without sticking your ontological neck out - and that is 'best explanation'.

The 41 ideas from 'Language,Truth and Logic'

7919 Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C]
6523 Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H]
6525 Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer]
6524 Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H]
4729 Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer]
5180 All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer]
5185 It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer]
5187 When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer]
5183 Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer]
5179 Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer]
5181 A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer]
5184 Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer]
5186 Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer]
5190 The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer]
5191 We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer]
5195 Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer]
5196 Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer]
5189 Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer]
5193 Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer]
5197 By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer]
5198 We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer]
2619 Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer]
5204 To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer]
5200 The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer]
5202 Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer]
5199 Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer]
4749 We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer]
5205 Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer]
23725 Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M]
5206 To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer]
5207 If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer]
5208 A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer]
5209 The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer]
5169 My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer]
5177 Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer]
5178 A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer]
5172 If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer]
5173 Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer]
5176 Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer]
5171 The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer]
5170 Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer]