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Single Idea 6537
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
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Full Idea
The teleological view begins to explain intentionality, and in particular allows brain states and events to have false intentional content; causal and nomological theories of intentionality tend to falter on this last task.
Clarification
'Nomological' views concern rule-following
Gist of Idea
Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories
Source
William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.4)
Book Ref
Lycan,William G.: 'Consciousness' [MIT 1995], p.45
A Reaction
Certainly if you say thought is 'caused' by the world, false thought become puzzling. I'm not sure I understand the rest of this, but it is an intriguing remark about a significant issue…
The
23 ideas
with the same theme
[how can intentional states be explained?]:
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6491
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Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought
[Berkeley, by Robinson,H]
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18088
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Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental
[Place]
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2554
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Is intentionality a special sort of function?
[Rorty]
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3481
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Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality
[Searle]
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3494
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Intentionality is defined in terms of representation
[Searle]
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2325
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It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality
[Kim]
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3365
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Intentionality involves both reference and content
[Kim]
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2527
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Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind
[Dennett]
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3158
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Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it
[Dennett]
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3976
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Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws
[Fodor]
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3980
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Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols
[Fodor]
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7326
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Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things
[Fodor]
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15494
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We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining
[Fodor]
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2981
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Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese?
[Lyons on Fodor]
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5000
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Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal
[Kirk,R]
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3164
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Intentional explanations are always circular
[Rey]
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6537
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Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories
[Lycan]
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2978
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Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality
[Lyons]
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2400
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Is intentionality just causal connections?
[Chalmers]
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7010
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Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality
[Heil]
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7054
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Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views
[Heil]
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4626
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The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world
[Heil]
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4940
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Physicists see information as a measure of order, but for biologists it is symbolic exchange between animals
[Edelman/Tononi]
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