more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 6539

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism ]

Full Idea

Even the software/hardware distinction as it is literally applied within computer science is philosophically unclear.

Gist of Idea

The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing

Source

William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.4)

Book Ref

Lycan,William G.: 'Consciousness' [MIT 1995], p.46


A Reaction

This is true, and very important for functionalist theories of the mind. Even very volatile software is realised in 'hard' physics, and rewritable discs etc blur the distinction between 'programmable' and 'hardwired'.


The 24 ideas from 'Consciousness'

If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan]
In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan]
I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan]
Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan]
Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan]
One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan]
Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan]
Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan]
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan]
The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan]
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan]
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan]
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan]
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan]
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan]
Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan]
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan]
'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan]
Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan]