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Single Idea 6541
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
]
Full Idea
The functionalist must find a level of characterisation of mental states that is not so abstract or behaviouristic as to rule out the possibility of inverted spectrum etc., nor so specific and structural as to fall into chauvinism.
Clarification
'Chauvinistic' implies that only human brains could have most of our experiences
Gist of Idea
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic
Source
William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.4)
Book Ref
Lycan,William G.: 'Consciousness' [MIT 1995], p.54
A Reaction
If too specific then animals and aliens won't be able to implement the necessary functions; if the theory becomes very behaviouristic, then it loses interest in the possibility of an inverted spectrum. He is certainly right to hunt for a middle ground.
The
24 ideas
from 'Consciousness'
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6527
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If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws
[Lycan]
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6528
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In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals
[Lycan]
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6529
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I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics
[Lycan]
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6531
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Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens
[Lycan]
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6532
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Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens
[Lycan]
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6534
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One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy
[Lycan]
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6533
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Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction
[Lycan]
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6535
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Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones
[Lycan]
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6530
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We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose
[Lycan]
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6536
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Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws
[Lycan]
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6539
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The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing
[Lycan]
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6537
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Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories
[Lycan]
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6538
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We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees
[Lycan]
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6543
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Intentionality comes in degrees
[Lycan]
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6545
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If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function
[Lycan]
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6541
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Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic
[Lycan]
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6542
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A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations
[Lycan]
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6544
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Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction
[Lycan]
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6546
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Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction
[Lycan]
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6547
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The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false
[Lycan]
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6548
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Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory
[Lycan]
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6549
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I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects
[Lycan]
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6551
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'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time
[Lycan]
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6554
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Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?"
[Lycan]
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