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Single Idea 6543
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
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Full Idea
Intentionality comes in degrees.
Gist of Idea
Intentionality comes in degrees
Source
William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.4)
Book Ref
Lycan,William G.: 'Consciousness' [MIT 1995], p.57
A Reaction
I agree. A footprint is 'about' a foot, in the sense of containing concentrated information about it. Can we, though, envisage a higher degree than human thought? Is there a maximum degree? Everything is 'about' everything, in some respect.
The
24 ideas
from 'Consciousness'
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6527
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If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws
[Lycan]
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6528
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In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals
[Lycan]
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6529
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I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics
[Lycan]
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6531
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Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens
[Lycan]
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6532
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Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens
[Lycan]
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6534
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One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy
[Lycan]
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6533
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Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction
[Lycan]
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6535
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Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones
[Lycan]
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6530
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We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose
[Lycan]
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6536
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Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws
[Lycan]
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6539
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The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing
[Lycan]
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6537
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Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories
[Lycan]
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6538
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We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees
[Lycan]
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6543
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Intentionality comes in degrees
[Lycan]
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6545
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If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function
[Lycan]
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6541
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Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic
[Lycan]
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6542
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A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations
[Lycan]
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6544
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Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction
[Lycan]
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6546
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Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction
[Lycan]
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6547
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The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false
[Lycan]
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6548
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Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory
[Lycan]
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6549
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I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects
[Lycan]
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6551
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'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time
[Lycan]
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6554
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Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?"
[Lycan]
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