more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 6543
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
]
Full Idea
Intentionality comes in degrees.
Gist of Idea
Intentionality comes in degrees
Source
William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.4)
Book Ref
Lycan,William G.: 'Consciousness' [MIT 1995], p.57
A Reaction
I agree. A footprint is 'about' a foot, in the sense of containing concentrated information about it. Can we, though, envisage a higher degree than human thought? Is there a maximum degree? Everything is 'about' everything, in some respect.
The
43 ideas
from William Lycan
6527
|
If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws
[Lycan]
|
6528
|
In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals
[Lycan]
|
6529
|
I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics
[Lycan]
|
6532
|
Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens
[Lycan]
|
6531
|
Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens
[Lycan]
|
6534
|
One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy
[Lycan]
|
6535
|
Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones
[Lycan]
|
6533
|
Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction
[Lycan]
|
6530
|
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose
[Lycan]
|
6536
|
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws
[Lycan]
|
6539
|
The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing
[Lycan]
|
6537
|
Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories
[Lycan]
|
6538
|
We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees
[Lycan]
|
6541
|
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic
[Lycan]
|
6542
|
A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations
[Lycan]
|
6543
|
Intentionality comes in degrees
[Lycan]
|
6544
|
Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction
[Lycan]
|
6545
|
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function
[Lycan]
|
6546
|
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction
[Lycan]
|
6547
|
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false
[Lycan]
|
6549
|
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects
[Lycan]
|
6548
|
Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory
[Lycan]
|
6551
|
'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time
[Lycan]
|
6554
|
Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?"
[Lycan]
|
5501
|
People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms
[Lycan]
|
5494
|
'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities
[Lycan]
|
5496
|
Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental
[Lycan]
|
5499
|
A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism
[Lycan]
|
5500
|
Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above
[Lycan]
|
7755
|
Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc.
[Lycan]
|
7763
|
It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name
[Lycan]
|
7764
|
Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it?
[Lycan]
|
7766
|
Meaning must be known before we can consider verification
[Lycan]
|
7768
|
The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation
[Lycan]
|
7770
|
Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate'
[Lycan]
|
7773
|
A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true
[Lycan]
|
7774
|
Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation
[Lycan]
|
15787
|
Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle
[Lycan]
|
15784
|
The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist
[Lycan]
|
15795
|
Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events
[Lycan]
|
15794
|
If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility
[Lycan]
|
15792
|
Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties
[Lycan]
|
15796
|
Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties
[Lycan]
|