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Single Idea 6544

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind ]

Full Idea

'Neuron' may be understood as a physiological term or a functional term, so even the Identity Theorist is a Functionalist - one who locates mental entities at a very low level of abstraction.

Gist of Idea

Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction

Source

William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.4)

Book Ref

Lycan,William G.: 'Consciousness' [MIT 1995], p.59

A Reaction

This is a striking observation, and somewhat inclines me to switch from identity theory to functionalism. If you ask what is the correct level of abstraction, Lycan's teleological-homuncular version refers you to all the levels.

The 43 ideas from William Lycan

6527 If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan]
6528 In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan]
6529 I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan]
6531 Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan]
6532 Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan]
6534 One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan]
6533 Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan]
6535 Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan]
6530 We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
6536 Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
6537 Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan]
6539 The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan]
6538 We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan]
6543 Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
6544 Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan]
6545 If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
6541 Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
6542 A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan]
6546 Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan]
6547 The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan]
6548 Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan]
6549 I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan]
6551 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan]
6554 Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan]
5501 People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan]
5494 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan]
5496 Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan]
5499 A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan]
5500 Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan]
7755 Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan]
7763 It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan]
7764 Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan]
7766 Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan]
7770 Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan]
7768 The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan]
7773 A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan]
7774 Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan]
15787 Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
15784 The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
15792 Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
15795 Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
15794 If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
15796 Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]