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Full Idea
It is just arbitrary to choose a level of nature a priori as the locus of qualia, even though we can agree that high levels (such as behaviourism) and low-levels (such as the subatomic) can be ruled out as totally improbable.
Clarification
The 'locus' is the area in which it moves
Gist of Idea
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false
Source
William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.6)
Book Ref
Lycan,William G.: 'Consciousness' [MIT 1995], p.69
A Reaction
Very good. People scream 'qualia!' whenever the behaviour level or the atomic level are proposed as the locations of the mind, but the suggestion that they are complex, and are spread across many functional levels in the middle sounds good.
12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
7387 | "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett] |
7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
2582 | A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block] |
7521 | It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands] |
7523 | The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands] |
3226 | Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind? [Rey] |
6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
7706 | If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette] |
7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
4935 | The sensation of red is a point in neural space created by dimensions of neuronal activity [Edelman/Tononi] |