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Single Idea 6548

[filed under theme 4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory ]

Full Idea

Eventually set theory will have to be either naturalised or rejected, if a thoroughgoing physicalism is to be maintained.

Gist of Idea

Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory

Source

William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 8.4)

Book Ref

Lycan,William G.: 'Consciousness' [MIT 1995], p.90

A Reaction

Personally I regard Platonism as a form of naturalism (though a rather bold and dramatic one). The central issue seems to be the ability of the human main/brain to form 'abstract' notions about the physical world in which it lives.

The 43 ideas from William Lycan

6527 If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan]
6528 In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan]
6529 I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan]
6531 Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan]
6532 Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan]
6534 One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan]
6533 Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan]
6535 Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan]
6530 We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
6536 Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
6537 Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan]
6539 The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan]
6538 We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan]
6543 Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
6544 Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan]
6545 If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
6541 Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
6542 A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan]
6546 Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan]
6547 The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan]
6548 Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan]
6549 I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan]
6551 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan]
6554 Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan]
5501 People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan]
5494 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan]
5496 Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan]
5499 A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan]
5500 Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan]
7755 Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan]
7763 It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan]
7764 Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan]
7766 Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan]
7770 Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan]
7768 The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan]
7773 A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan]
7774 Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan]
15787 Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
15784 The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
15792 Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
15795 Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
15794 If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
15796 Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]