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Single Idea 6549
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
]
Full Idea
Personally I favour direct realism regarding secondary qualities, and identify greenness with some complex microphysical property exemplified by green physical objects.
Gist of Idea
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects
Source
William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 8.4)
Book Ref
Lycan,William G.: 'Consciousness' [MIT 1995], p.91
A Reaction
He cites D.M.Armstrong (1981) as his source. Personally I find this a bewildering proposal. Does he think there is greenness in grass AS WELL AS the emission of that wavelength of electro-magnetic radiation? Is greenness zooming through the air?
The
16 ideas
with the same theme
[we are in direct contact with reality]:
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21337
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A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known
[Aquinas]
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22130
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Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view
[Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
|
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3943
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If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception?
[Berkeley]
|
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23662
|
The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects
[Reid]
|
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14866
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It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears
[Nietzsche]
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21537
|
I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations'
[Russell]
|
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5377
|
'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements
[Russell]
|
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22160
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Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use
[Heidegger]
|
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5678
|
Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly
[Dancy,J]
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5681
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Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error
[Dancy,J]
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6549
|
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects
[Lycan]
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6355
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Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6643
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'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality
[Lowe]
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19526
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Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances?
[Williamson]
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16374
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There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link
[Recanati]
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8417
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Direct realism is false, because defeasibility questions are essential to perceptual knowledge
[Galloway]
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