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Single Idea 6554

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique ]

Full Idea

Old joke: two Behaviourists meet in the street, and the first says,"You're fine; how am I?"

Gist of Idea

Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?"

Source

William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], n1.6)

Book Ref

Lycan,William G.: 'Consciousness' [MIT 1995], p.131


A Reaction

This invites the response that introspection is uniquely authoritative about 'how we are', but this has been challenged quite a lot recently, which pushes us to consider whether these stupid behaviourists might actually have a good point.


The 24 ideas from 'Consciousness'

If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan]
In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan]
I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan]
Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan]
Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan]
One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan]
Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan]
Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan]
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan]
Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan]
We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan]
Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan]
Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan]
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan]
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan]
Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan]
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan]
'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan]
Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan]