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Single Idea 6612

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences ]

Full Idea

It is objected to dispositionalism that without the principle of least action, or some general principle of equal power, the specific dispositional properties of things could tell us very little about how these things would be disposed to behave.

Clarification

'Least action' says nature always takes the shortest route

Gist of Idea

Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties

Source

Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005], 90)

Book Ref

-: 'Analysis 65.1 Jan 2005' [- 2005], p.90


A Reaction

Ellis attempts to meet this criticism, by placing dispositional properties within a hierarchy of broader properties. There remains a nagging doubt about how essentialism can account for space, time, order, and the existence of essences.


The 15 ideas with the same theme [whether we can know essences, and if so, how]:

Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study [Aristotle]
No one even knows the nature and properties of a fly - why it has that colour, or so many feet [Bacon,R]
We identify substances by supposing that groups of sensations arise from an essence [Locke]
Other spirits may exceed us in knowledge, by knowing the inward constitution of things [Locke]
By digging deeper into the axioms we approach the essence of sciences, and unity of knowedge [Hilbert]
Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi]
Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis]
Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology [Ellis]
It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality [Shoemaker]
Science searches basic structures in search of essences [Kripke]
Find the essence by varying an object, to see what remains invariable [Velarde-Mayol]
Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford]
To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford]
Essentialism starts from richly structured categories, leading to a search for underlying properties [Gelman]
If flame colour is characteristic of a metal, that is an empirical claim needing justification [Bird]