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Full Idea
It is objected to dispositionalism that without the principle of least action, or some general principle of equal power, the specific dispositional properties of things could tell us very little about how these things would be disposed to behave.
Clarification
'Least action' says nature always takes the shortest route
Gist of Idea
Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties
Source
Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005], 90)
Book Ref
-: 'Analysis 65.1 Jan 2005' [- 2005], p.90
A Reaction
Ellis attempts to meet this criticism, by placing dispositional properties within a hierarchy of broader properties. There remains a nagging doubt about how essentialism can account for space, time, order, and the existence of essences.
6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |
6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |