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Single Idea 6620

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument ]

Full Idea

Davidson's version of the identity theory is couched in terms of events rather than states, because he regards causation as a relation between events.

Gist of Idea

Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation

Source

report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.2 n12

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.33


A Reaction

I think it may be more to the point that the mind is a dynamic thing, and so it consists of events rather than states, and hence we want to know what those events are made up from. I think my chair is causing me to rest above the floor…


The 13 ideas with the same theme [claim that mental causation requires physicalism]:

The soul cannot be incorporeal, because then it could neither act nor be acted upon [Epicurus]
A body is required for anything to have causal relations [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley]
Experienced time means no two mental moments are ever alike [Bergson]
Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson]
Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim]
Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim]
It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau]
Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane]
If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil]
The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil]
The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon]