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Single Idea 6622

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism ]

Full Idea

The rejection of type-type identity and acceptance of token-token identity is referred to as 'non-reductive physicalism', and is usually link with the idea that mental state types are not identical with physical state types, but 'supervene' on them.

Clarification

Token-token says all mental events have brain events; type-type adds that they must always be of the same type

Gist of Idea

Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain

Source

E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.49


A Reaction

A nice summary of the view (built on the arguments of Davidson) which has also become known as 'property dualism'. Personally I regard it as dangerous nonsense. If two things 'supervene' on one another, the first question to ask is: why?


The 17 ideas with the same theme [mind is a non-reducible physical property]:

There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle]
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle]
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle]
Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle]
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim]
Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim]
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor]
Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor]
Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane]
H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers]
'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil]
Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe]
Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin]