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Full Idea
The idea that 'qualia' exist but are causally inert is difficult to sustain: for if they are causally inert, how can we even know about them?
Gist of Idea
If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them?
Source
E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.59
A Reaction
The brain might be a special case. I can't know about a 'causally inert' object in my kitchen, but I might know about it if in some way I AM that object. Personally, though, I think everything that exists is causally active.
| 3157 | T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism [Huxley, by Rey] |
| 3154 | Brain causes mind, but it doesn't seem that mind causes actions [Huxley] |
| 20374 | Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche] |
| 14494 | Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S] |
| 3398 | Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S] |
| 3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
| 4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
| 7379 | If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett] |
| 2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
| 7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
| 7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
| 4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
| 6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |