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Single Idea 6630
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
]
Full Idea
Eliminative materialism may be accused of incoherence, insofar as is threatens to eliminate reason and truth along with the propositional attitudes.
Clarification
Beliefs and desires are examples of 'propositional attitudes'
Gist of Idea
Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes
Source
E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.68
A Reaction
Lowe does not enlarge on this intriguing suggestion. I don't see a threat to truth, if brain events represent the outer world, as they can do it more or less well. Logic is built on truth. Reason grows out of logic. Evidence seems okay… Hm.
The
19 ideas
with the same theme
[there is no such thing as mind, only the brain]:
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5997
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Dicaearchus said soul does not exist, but is just a configuration of the body
[Dicaearchus, by Fortenbaugh]
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9285
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'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul'
[James]
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3131
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Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism
[Quine, by Rey]
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2344
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If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic
[Putnam]
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5800
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All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions
[Dretske]
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3377
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Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation
[Kim]
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7366
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It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious
[Dennett]
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7380
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Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing
[Dennett]
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4988
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Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false
[Kirk,R on Churchland,PM]
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4987
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Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced
[Churchland,PM]
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4876
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Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind
[Dennett]
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7656
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I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is
[Dennett]
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4984
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All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics
[Kirk,R]
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2954
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Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges
[Lockwood]
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3140
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If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it
[Rey]
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3134
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Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain
[Rey]
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5342
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Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser
[Flanagan]
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4609
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It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs
[Heil]
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6630
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Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes
[Lowe]
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